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13 
MASTERING THE CASES AND 
DELINEATING THE ROLE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT1 
REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS 
OF CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE 
PRESENT. By Keith E. Whittington.2 University Press of 
Kansas. 2019. Pp. xxi + 410. $39.95 (Cloth). 
Sanford Levinson3 
The first thing readers of Keith Whittington’s remarkable 
book should notice is its title, Judicial Review of Acts of Congress 
from the Founding to the Present. What he has done is to carefully 
read and evaluate 1308 cases decided over the entire history of the 
United States Supreme Court, from the beginning until the end of 
the 2017 Term in the spring of 2018, all of which involve “judicial 
review of acts of Congress.” Whittington does not consider any of 
the myriad of cases, most famously including Brown v. Board of 
Education, invalidating state legislation. Oliver Wendell Holmes 
famously opined that “I do not think that the United States would 
come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress 
void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not 
make that declaration as to the laws of the several States.”4 In 
some ways, Whittington’s book is a wonderful examination of the 
validity of Holmes’s assertion with regard to Acts of Congress. 
Of the cases considered, 345 “involve invalidations or 
limitations of statutory provisions [based on a desire to avoid a 
constitutional conflict], while another 963 upheld federal 
 
 1. This article is a lightly revised version of my Foreword to KEITH WHITTINGTON, 
REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS OF CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO 
THE PRESENT (2019). My thanks to the Press for permission to republish the Foreword.  
 2. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University.  
 3. W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, 
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. 
 4. O. W. HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295–96 
(1920). 
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legislation against constitutional challenge” (p. 25). I have been 
teaching constitutional law for over forty years, and I can confess 
that I have not read the multitude of cases surveyed by 
Whittington; an unscientific check with colleagues who also teach 
the subject leads me to believe that I am not an outlier. The late 
University of Chicago Law Professor David Currie is famous for 
having read every case while writing his multivolume study of the 
Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court, but he may 
well be close to unique. And, as much to the point, he was not 
testing hypotheses in the way that the social scientist Whittington 
is. 
So Whittington is presenting a book almost certainly 
unprecedented in its scope and ambition. In addition to Currie’s 
almost literally idiosyncratic enterprise, there may be “period” 
histories of the Supreme Court whose authors read all of the cases 
within what now seems a relatively brief period. But none of the 
more comprehensive one-volume general histories can claim the 
authority that Whittington evokes on almost every page. It is 
unimaginable that any professional academic, whether teaching 
law, political science, or American political history, will not treat 
this book as an indispensable source. But, fortunately, it is also 
written in a manner that should interest the general reader as well 
who wants to know how important the Supreme Court has really 
been throughout the course of American history. It is altogether 
fitting that Whittington was announced in November 2019 as the 
recipient of the Thomas M. Cooley Book Prize, and I suspect that 
will be only the first such award. 
One often reads stories in the press—and occasionally even 
in the academic literature—proclaiming that Sandra Day 
O’Connor and then Anthony Kennedy were the most important 
political decisionmakers in America. In their role as the “median 
justices” on the Court, they often provided the “swing votes” in  
5–4 decisions otherwise comprised of four highly predictable 
conservatives and four equally predictable liberals. For those who 
unthinkingly quoted Tocqueville’s observation, during the 1830s, 
that all political issues in America ended up being legalized and 
ultimately decided by the judiciary, this meant a) that what the 
Supreme Court did was surpassingly important and b) that the 
“median justice” along the spectrum of the Court was especially 
important. Tocqueville’s first observation may have been true: 
Americans do have a tendency to treat political issues as raising 
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questions about what the Constitution permits or prohibits. But 
he was almost certainly wrong in his second observation. Many 
extraordinarily important issues never come before the Court or, 
should a lawyer be so bold as to bring a case, they are dismissed 
on a variety of grounds that allow the Court to avoid issuing a 
decision. As Frederick Schauer notably demonstrated well over a 
decade ago in the pages of the Harvard Law Review, the issues 
that most Americans tell pollsters are principal sources of concern 
and anguish rarely come before the judiciary, including, most 
vividly, decisions that involve basic issues of war and peace or 
arguable “solutions” to problems posed by a globalized economy 
or global warming.5 Even if many more constitutional challenges 
are filed regarding legislation simply because Congress, at least 
until recently, was passing so many more acts, that does not at all 
mean that the Supreme Court will be receptive, or even choose to 
grant arguments the dignity of a full hearing. The Court has 
steadily been reducing the actual number of cases it is willing to 
decide, so that in recent years it has issued opinions in only 
roughly 70–75 cases, many of them of interest only to the litigants 
or specialists in arcane areas of the law. 
As Whittington demonstrates, echoing an earlier analysis by 
the late Charles Black, the principal role of the Supreme Court 
over our history is to legitimate actions, particularly by the 
national government, rather than to strike them down. My own 
beloved mentor, the late Robert G. McCloskey, once wrote that 
“the essential business of the Supreme Court is to say ‘no’ to 
government.”6 For better or worse, this is almost certainly false, 
especially if by “government” one means the national 
government, the focus of Whittington’s attention. It may be true 
that the significance of the legitimation that comes through saying 
“yes” depends on the possibility that it might instead offer a 
McCloskeyan “no,” but one ought not confuse the possibility with 
the overall likelihood of judicial action. The most truly “essential” 
business of the Court has been legitimation, not invalidation. 
It is worth asking, though, under which circumstances the 
Court can successfully legitimate governmental actions that are 
opposed by significant sectors of the public. The Court itself once 
 
 5. See Frederick Schauer, The Court’s Agenda—And the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (2006). 
 6. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5–6 (Robert G. 
McCloskey ed., 1957). 
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noted that Lincoln did not sue for a judicial declaration that 
secession by South Carolina was illegal; nor, of course, had James 
Buchanan, who agreed with Lincoln that secession was in fact 
unconstitutional. The reason, presumably, was simple: Even if one 
could imagine a federal court in 1861 issuing such a decree, it was 
unimaginable that South Carolina would in fact honor it, any 
more than Lincoln chose to honor the declaration by Chief Justice 
Taney in Ex parte Merryman7 that he was without power 
unilaterally to suspend habeas corpus, a power not even enjoyed 
by the British Monarch (and granted Lincoln by Congress only in 
1863). If anything, Lincoln’s example—and the veneration 
accorded our 16th President—has served to delegitimate Taney 
and to legitimate presidential power. “Legitimacy” is a complex 
process, especially once we realize that it requires actual 
acceptance by target populations rather than what Madison might 
have dismissed as a “parchment barrier” of a judicial decision per 
se. 
Whittington couches his book as in some way a test of Robert 
Dahl’s famous propositions: first, that the Supreme Court must be 
understood as a basically political institution, and, secondly, that 
this means one must strive to understand the special 
circumstances under which the Court will invalidate a 
congressional act.8 After all, no one joins the Court without the 
approval of the dominant political coalition at a given time, 
consisting of the President, doing the nominating, and then the 
Senate, doing the confirming. Thus, Dahl suggested, invalidation 
was most likely when a Court representing a new coalition would 
be considering legislation passed some years ago by the ruling 
coalition then exercising political hegemony. By definition, what 
would be rare would be the invalidation of recent legislation, 
unless there was what might be termed a “regime lag,” whereby 
the Court was still dominated by veterans of the now-supplanted 
coalition who would valiantly, if often unsuccessfully, try to stave 
off the reality of the fact that elections really do have 
consequences. Perhaps it should not be surprising that 
Whittington demonstrates serious flaws in Dahl’s argument, given 
that his article, now well over a half-century old, was the first 
serious attempt to offer an empirical analysis of the circumstances 
 
 7. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861). 
 8. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). 
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under which the Court would invalidate acts of Congress. 
Even if Whittington demonstrates that the Court is more of 
an active political player than Dahl might be read to have 
suggested, he nonetheless reinforces the position taken by Gerald 
Rosenberg in his classic book, The Hollow Hope, which suggested 
that political activists were wrong to put too much hope in the 
Court to deviate very much from the general drift of American 
public opinion or, perhaps more to the point, the views of political 
elites who in fact dominate the American political system by 
winning elections and taking office.9 Rosenberg was writing 
especially about progressive forces who hoped the Court would 
be an all-important ally and, therefore, make it far less important 
to win actual political victories in elections and then legislatures. 
But it can apply as well to conservatives who hoped, as in the 
1930s, that the Court could prevent the reforms of the New Deal 
or, more recently, strike down the hated Affordable Care Act 
that, among other things, threatens to entrench medical care as an 
“entitlement” in the same sense that has become true of Social 
Security, one of the key pieces of New Deal legislation. Other 
targets of conservative ire, including the use of racial preferences 
in a variety of contexts or the protection of reproductive choice, 
have much more to do with state legislation and the meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment than with the domain of national 
legislative power. Perhaps the ascent of Brett Kavanaugh to the 
Court to replace Anthony Kennedy will invalidate the premise of 
this last sentence regarding the hesitation to limit national power, 
but Whittington’s own analysis allows us to wonder, especially 
given potential election results. 
It would be a mistake, which Whittington certainly does not 
make, to dismiss the Court as unimportant. That would be 
carrying revisionism much too far! What is crucial, both for the 
academic scholar and the general reader simply trying better to 
understand the American political system, is to get a well-founded 
sense of those occasions in which the Court has acted in a fairly 
determinative manner, with regard to other political forces, and 
when, on the contrary, it has basically chosen to keep its powder 
dry by refusing to engage in fights that it believes it cannot win. 
Here Whittington is invaluable. 
 
 9. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).  
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In addition to the grand theme of trying to figure out how the 
Court has navigated potential conflicts with Congress over the 
past 225 years, Whittington offers a host of valuable insights along 
the way. Begin only with the hoary story that Marbury v. 
Madison10 “created” judicial review and that, after the 1803 
decision in that case, the Court did not engage in another such act 
until the notorious Dred Scott case in 1857.11 Both are untrue. 
Whittington notes first that there were several cases before 
Marbury that presupposed the power of the Court to invalidate 
congressional acts thought to be in violation of the Constitution, 
even if the Court came up with the “happy ending” that no such 
invalidation was required in the case at hand (pp. 38, 60–77). 
Marbury, of course, was different, though it is essential to note 
that the actual statute invalidated was remarkably unimportant, 
save in terms of the political actualities of the moment. The real 
question was whether the Court would order Secretary of State 
James Madison to deliver a judicial commission to William 
Marbury in defiance of the determination of President Thomas 
Jefferson not to do so. The nascent Court could scarcely 
countenance open defiance or, just as ominously, the prospect of 
Jeffersonian efforts at impeachment as a means of disciplining an 
out-of-control Federalist Court determined not to recognize the 
so-called “Revolution of 1800” that displaced the prior Federalist 
hegemony. What was easiest was to declare that the Court had no 
power to order the delivery because the statute allegedly giving it 
such power was unconstitutional. And, a week later, as 
Whittington notes, the Court almost laconically upheld the ability 
of the Jeffersonian Congress in effect to purge the federal 
judiciary of a number of Federalist judges simply by repealing the 
Act, passed in the waning days of the Adams Administration, to 
create an intermediate tier of Federal Circuit Courts, whose 
members had been quickly appointed and confirmed by the lame-
duck Federalist Congress (pp. 79–80). It is an unfortunate truth 
that this second case, Stuart v. Laird,12 is rarely taught alongside 
Marbury, even though it is surely at least as important if one is 
trying to understand the actual role (or ability) of the Supreme 
Court to resist an insistent political movement. 
But what about the period 1803–1857? Building on the 
 
 10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  
 11. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 12. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803). 
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valuable insights of Mark Graber (with whom Whittington has co-
edited, along with Howard Gillman, a path-breaking casebook on 
American constitutional development13), Whittington 
demonstrates that there were a number of cases involving 
statutory interpretation in which one can understand the 
interpretations only against the background assumption that a 
contrary interpretation would have rendered the law 
unconstitutional, whether or not the Court actually uses such 
language (pp. 85–119). Many professors will have to revise their 
lectures in light of Whittington’s scholarship. But he also 
demonstrates that there were relatively few occasions for judicial 
review, under any definition, because Congress just wasn’t passing 
that much legislation to review. The cases Graber and 
Whittington rely on are known to extremely few academics 
because, frankly, they are not thought to be that important in 
terms of the substantive issues raised. But, as sources of genuine 
illumination of how judges were thinking during this period, they 
are invaluable. As Whittington writes, “The practice of judicial 
review was built up through the resolution of more mundane cases 
[than those emphasized by most scholars] in which the political 
stakes were relatively low” (p. 117). 
Along with Dahl, Whittington is also assessing the all-too-
influential argument of Yale Law School Professor Alexander 
Bickel that the Court’s exercise of judicial review is “counter-
majoritarian,” in which the unelected judges substitute their 
judgment for that of an ostensible majority.14 It is worth quoting 
Whittington at some length, for it is a decisive rejoinder to the 
more simplistic statements of Bickel’s thesis, which rests on the 
clearly counterfactual assumptions that any act that receives a 
majority of votes in Congress necessarily represents even the 
strong endorsement of those voting “aye,” let alone that of their 
constituents. Many cases, Whittington writes, 
could benefit the individual litigant and clean up the processes 
of government, but they had few larger policy ramifications. 
They spoke to no serious ideological or partisan disputes and 
disadvantaged no important political interests. They illustrated 
the justices bringing their lawyerly expertise to bear in 
 
 13. HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: VOLUME II: RIGHTS & LIBERTIES (2d ed. 2016). 
 14. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
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resolving complex legal disputes. In doing so, they filled out the 
constitutional rulebook and took note of when Congress had 
stepped over the lines into foul territory. But such exercises of 
the power of judicial review were countermajoritarian only in 
the most formal sense of scrutinizing the work product of 
elected legislators and correcting its deficiencies and of being 
available to hear the complaints of individuals who were 
dissatisfied with how the government had treated them. (pp. 
142–43) 
Harvard political scientist Kenneth Shepsle in 1992 famously 
suggested that Congress is a “they,” not an “it.”15 What this means 
is that political coalitions that pass legislation usually consist of 
multiple viewpoints that might vote together on a given piece of 
legislation; but for some members within the coalition, the 
affirmative vote is far more a matter of being a good team player, 
or recipient of a logrolling benefit with regard to legislation they 
really care about, than a statement of deep principle. So this in 
effect gives the Court some significant leeway to strike down even 
relatively recent legislation, passed by the same coalition that 
arguably placed the judges in office, at least so long as the 
legislation doesn’t reflect a truly strong (and unified) party 
position. This is one more genuine insight that will require 
additional rewriting of lecture notes and revision of published 
textbooks that adopt a more holistic view of ostensibly dominant 
coalitions. This point is especially powerfully made with regard to 
the cleavages within the Democratic Party regarding the passage 
of an income tax, notoriously declared unconstitutional by the 
Court in 1894. 
Still, as Whittington notes on the very same page from which 
the prior quotation comes, even these relatively “routine cases of 
judicial review were also more likely than not to come out in favor 
of the government” (p. 143). Constitutional challenges in fact 
were rarely successful; “the Court has more often been a 
handmaiden to the congressional exercise of power than an 
obstruction” (p. 25). And, yet again, “the most striking feature of 
the Court’s exercise of judicial review vis-à-vis Congress is how 
mundane it seems to have been. History remembers the 
highlights—the income tax cases, E.C. Knight, the child labor 
case—but this was but a small part of the Court’s work and leaves 
 
 15. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as 
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). 
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a misleading impression of how judicial review was exercised.”16 
As one would expect (and demand), Whittington includes 
full discussions of the canonical “highlights,” including, of course, 
the epic struggle between the “Old Court” and FDR over the 
constitutionality of New Deal measures. But he is convincing in 
his overall thesis, which is, simply put, that we overemphasize the 
frequency of such cases and thus, concomitantly, overestimate the 
extent to which the exercise of judicial review has genuinely been 
highly controversial. At any given moment, as the political 
scientist James Gibson argued in a, for me, unforgettable lecture 
at the University of Texas Law School some years ago, it is highly 
likely that a majority of the population will in fact support any 
given decision. This is because, say, 35% of the population will 
support ideologically the result reached by the Court, as was 
probably true even during the New Deal shootout, given that 
Kansas Governor Alf Landon received 36.5% of the popular vote 
during FDR’s landslide victory in 1936; another, say, 20–25% of 
the population might accord the Court what political scientists call 
“diffuse support,” which boils down to the position, “I really don’t 
know anything about the Constitution, and I trust the Supreme 
Court to know what it is doing when it declares something 
unconstitutional [or constitutional],” leaving only a probable 
minority that truly offers vigorous opposition to the substance of 
a Supreme Court decision. There may be some exceptions: 
Roughly 90% of those polled have registered their opposition to 
the 2010 decision of the Court in Citizens United,17 which 
invalidated a century-old limitation on the ability of corporations 
to participate directly in political campaigns, but efforts to 
overturn the decision have gone nowhere. But it is possible that 
Citizens United is exceptional, even if it is far more the subject of 
scholarly attention, with regard to considering judicial review, 
than the more mundane cases that get equal treatment. 
Whittington concludes this true magnum opus by writing as 
follows: 
The Court has rarely stood for universally embraced and 
historically enduring political principles, in part because there 
are not very many such principles—or at least not very many 
such principles that must be displayed to invalidate an action 
 
 16. Id. at 171. 
 17. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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of Congress. Congress rarely violates universally embraced and 
historically enduring political principles. Congress does, 
however, routinely violate principles that are more contested 
and less enduring but that nonetheless command substantial 
political support within a given historical era. When the Court 
intervenes to vindicate those principles against an errant 
national legislature, it is often doing the political work that 
political leaders would like it to do. It is acting as a player 
within democratic politics, but not simply as a constitutional 
guardian standing outside of democratic politics.”18  
Inevitably, readers may quibble with some of Whittington’s 
specific judgments, particularly about what might be termed the 
“objective importance” of certain instances of judicial 
invalidation (or upholding questionable, albeit highly popular, 
legislation). But that does not really abate my enthusiasm for the 
book or lessen the encouragement of anyone interested in the 
actualities of the American political system to read it and ponder 
its findings carefully. The University Press of Kansas series within 
which Whittington’s book appears is devoted to innovative 
approaches to “constitutional thinking.” It fully deserves its 
placement in the series and unequivocal admiration for the deep 
scholarship it reveals. That it may also generate further argument 
is only added testament to its importance. 
 
 
 18. WHITTINGTON, supra note 1, at 314.  
